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tures as barriers? A comparison of native-born and immi-
grant unemployment durations across 12 European countries
This study investigated the effect of institutions on the
unemployment duration gap between non-EU immigrants and
native-born in 12 European countries. Going further than the
existing literature, our study encompassed unemployment
duration, distinguishing between exits to inactivity, primary
and secondary employment. Additionally, we have provided
a stronger micro-foundation to the comparative literature by
introducing institutional measures for unemployment-related
benefits at the individual level rather than merely using
aggregate proxies. Our analysis found no disincentive effects
of benefits for immigrants. Furthermore, the employment
prospects of immigrants were better when the demand for
low-skilled labour was high, and immigration policy was
labour market-oriented. In contrast, employment protection
legislation did not affect the unemployment duration of
immigrants.
Introduction
In recent decades, Western Europe has become the
destination for immigrants originating from all over
the world. In most countries, the labour market inte-
gration of these immigrants has proven problematic.
Sometimes even second-generation immigrants have
lower labour market participation rates (Hammarstedt
& Ekberg, 2004). A crucial indicator of the poor
labour market integration is their relatively high
unemployment rates which, at times, more than dou-
ble that of native-borns (OECD, 2008). This unem-
ployment gap has caused political and public concern
as it is assumed to challenge social cohesion and to
undermine the sustainability of welfare states (Bask,
2005; Bauer et al., & Sinning, 2011; Zimmermann,
1995). In some countries, benefits have also been
criticised as creating welfare dependency, particularly
for immigrants (Corrigan, 2010).
However, the unemployment gap between immi-
grants and the native-born varies across countries,
largely following the pattern of the different types of
welfare states. In particular, immigrants appear to
have great difficulty in gaining a foothold on the
Scandinavia and some Continental European labour
markets, whilst integration seems to be less problem-
atic in the rest of Europe, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon and Southern European countries (OECD,
2008).1 An emerging body of comparative research
has tried to explain this by suggesting that: ‘. . .
immigration policies, labour market structure and reg-
ulations, and welfare regimes influence the basic
mechanism of labour market allocation - that is, how
these structural components shape employers’ and
job seekers’ resources and preferences, which deter-
mine the way individuals are matched with jobs’
(Kogan, 2007, p. 183; see also Reitz, 1998).
Despite the merits of the scarce comparative litera-
ture on the unemployment gap between native-born
and immigrants, it has three main shortcomings. First,
studies have typically relied on a single measure,
either the unemployment rate at the macro level or
unemployment incidence at the individual level.
In fact, unemployment persistence or duration has
rarely been used in the cross-country comparative
1 It should be noted that the integration of immigrants in
Scandinavia has improved in recent years, possibly because
of the implementation of various types of integration
measures.
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literature. Only Kogan (2004a) has measured unem-
ployment duration with monthly precession while
comparing immigrant performances in Germany and
the UK. It is more interesting to know how host
country institutions or structures influence unemploy-
ment duration. Long-term unemployment poses a
greater threat to the labour market integration of
immigrants than does the high incidence of unem-
ployment in itself, because it is often associated with
skills depreciation, worker discouragement and ulti-
mately with stigma and marginalisation. Furthermore,
information about unemployment duration provides
further insights into the large unemployment gap
between immigrants and the native-born as it provides
knowledge on the mechanisms that delay transitions
to employment for immigrants. With this knowledge,
it is easier for policy makers to design efficient poli-
cies for improving the labour market integration of
immigrants. Second, most studies ignore the fact that
because immigrants are predominantly employed in
low-skilled jobs, their inferior labour market integra-
tion may have more to do with the quality of jobs
than with their aggregate job-finding probability
(Kogan, 2007). Transitions from unemployment to
inactivity have also been neglected. Immigrants may
be more affected by the ‘discouraged worker problem’
than are native-born, as they may simply stop search-
ing for a job because of repeated refusals. This would
lead to higher rates of ‘hidden’ unemployment among
immigrants. Thirdly, previous research has relied
mainly on macrolevel indicators when investigating
institutional effects. The effect of economic incentives
is typically measured by including welfare regime
dummies (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Kogan,
2006), by comparing countries belonging to different
types of welfare states (Kesler, 2006), or by an index
for the generosity and duration of unemployment ben-
efits (Reyneri & Fullin, 2011). This is particularly
problematic because there are large variations in poli-
cies even for countries belonging to the same welfare
regime (see the Data section in this article). Moreover,
these indexes are constructed to capture aspects of
welfare state policies for the native-born and therefore
do not necessarily apply to immigrants. Another prob-
lem is that a vast economic literature shows that disin-
centive effects of unemployment benefits are
determined at the individual level and not at the coun-
try level (Holmlund, 1998; Mortensen, 1977). For this
reason, even though the aforementioned research that
relies on macrolevel indicators provides valuable
nuances to the cross-national debate about the labour
market integration of immigrants, its microfoundation
is somewhat less developed.
The aim of this study was to investigate the influ-
ence of host country features—unemployment benefits,
immigration policy, employment protection legislation
(EPL) and employment structure—on differences in
unemployment duration between non-EU immigrants
and native-born in 12 European countries. In particu-
lar, we contrasted two theoretical explanations about
the effect of benefits. The first is an explanation that
builds on the comparative theoretical framework and
predicts that unemployment benefits create disincen-
tives for immigrant employment (Kesler, 2006; Kogan,
2006, 2007). The second explanation suggests that
there are no disincentive effects specific to immigrants
and that access to benefits can even improve their
labour market integration (see further discussion in the
next section). Concerning the other three institutions/
structures, we followed the theoretical approach of pre-
vious studies (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Kesler,
2006; Kogan, 2007; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011). More
specifically, we expected that immigrants will suffer
from more persistent unemployment when the demand
for low-skilled labour is low, the EPL is strict and
when the immigration policy has a humanitarian focus.
Our analysis therefore extends the existing literature in
three ways. First, we provide a stronger microfounda-
tion to the comparative literature by having introduced
institutional measures for unemployment-related bene-
fits at the individual level rather than merely using
aggregate proxies. Second, we focused on unemploy-
ment duration and not on unemployment incidence.
Third, we distinguished between transitions from
unemployment into three states: inactivity, primary
labour market, and secondary labour market. The
method we applied is a competing-risk event-history
model using monthly data from the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (ECHP).
The outline of the study is as follows. The next
section provides a review of the literature. The data
and methodology are discussed in the third section.
The results and conclusions are presented in the
fourth and fifth sections, respectively.
Host country characteristics and immigrant
unemployment
Unemployment benefits: disincentive effects or
efficiency gains for immigrants?
From job search theory and a vast empirical litera-
ture, we know that benefits increase unemployment
duration (for an overview, see Holmlund, 1998; Mor-
tensen, 1977). In greater detail, benefits reduce search
intensity and increase the reservation wage of the
unemployed, which in turn makes them inclined to
prolong their unemployment spell (Mortensen, 1977).
The comparative literature implicitly builds on this
line of thought, but inflates it to macrolevel and com-
bines it with the theory of welfare regimes put for-
ward by Esping-Andersen (1990). One of the major
contributors is Kogan (2007) who suggested that the
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unemployment gap between immigrants and native-
born is smaller in countries where the welfare system
is meagre or discriminates against the foreign-born
(especially the Southern European welfare states).
This is because the immigrants’ initial labour market
disadvantages (related to discrimination, lack of a
network, country specific human capital and knowl-
edge about the labour market etc.) are likely to be
offset by their relatively stronger work incentives in
these countries, or a lower reservation wage to use
the terminology of job search theory (see also Mor-
tensen, 1977).2 In contrast, the unemployment gap is
larger in the Scandinavian countries because their
open and generous welfare states allow immigrants to
sustain job search longer. According to Kogan
(2007), immigrants are therefore also less likely to be
pushed into the secondary labour market in Scandina-
via, but can wait for a good job in the primary labour
market (Kesler, 2006; Kogan, 2006, 2007).
Following this idea, but applying it to individual
level mechanisms rather than country level aggre-
gates, immigrants who receive generous benefits
should have an even lower chance than native-born
to receive a wage offer that exceeds their reservation
wage. As a result and in line with the economic and
comparative literature, (generous) benefits will delay
transitions to employment more for immigrants than
for native-born (Hypothesis 1).
Nevertheless, benefits can also produce certain effi-
ciency gains. From this perspective, unemployment-
related allowances first of all provide financial resour-
ces and hence create incentives to continue active job
search (see e.g., Addison & Portugal, 2003; Rosholm
& Vejlin, 2010). Secondly, providing financial resour-
ces to the unemployed may also indirectly improve
their personal resources by partly preventing the
decline in psychological well-being observed during
unemployment (Ervasti & Venetoklis, 2010; Fryer,
1986; Goul Andersen, 2002; Leana & Feldman, 1988;
Nordenmark Strandh, & Layte, 2006; Whelan, 1992).
This is crucial, as we know that psychological well-
being is an important determinant for job search behav-
iour and subsequent employment outcomes (Meyers &
Houssemand, 2010). Furthermore, welfare states that
provide generous unemployment benefits are also more
inclined to grant extra support (and monitoring) from
public employment agents. Support in terms of job
search assistance and contacts with employers increase
the job offer arrival rate and transition to employment.
All in all, because immigrants, on average, face more
severe employment barriers, these efficiency gains, or
‘resource effects’, are, according to this alternative per-
spective, likely to be stronger for immigrants than for
native-born and counterbalance or neutralise the nega-
tive effects expected in Hypothesis 1. Consequently,
the impact of unemployment-related benefits on transi-
tions to employment (both primary and secondary)
would be similar for immigrants and native-born.
Furthermore, if immigrants are more likely than the
native-born to become discouraged because of the
abovementioned disadvantages, the resources from ben-
efits may be relatively more important for preventing
immigrants exiting to inactivity (Hypothesis 2).
Labour market institutions and structures
Labour market institutions and structures are also likely
to affect the unemployment-duration gap between
immigrants and native-born (Cohen & Kogan, 2006;
Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Kogan, 2006). The
EPL affects the employers’ hiring and firing costs and
thus the wage offer distribution.3 Arguably, strict EPL
makes employers screen job applicants more carefully
in order to spot potential low-productive workers
(Gangl, 2012; Giesecke & Groß, 2003; Kogan, 2007).
In the absence of perfect information on worker produc-
tivity, employers may give preference to applicants
from groups that are assumed to have a high average
productivity. Using observed characteristics as proxies
for productivity, employers apply ‘statistical discrimina-
tion’ against several groups, for example women, young
people and immigrants (Kogan, 2006; Phelps, 1972).
This may increase their unemployment duration. In con-
trast, employers in flexible labour markets are assumed
to be more prone to use a trial and error strategy as a
screening device (Giesecke & Groß, 2003). Therefore,
immigrants should have more employment opportuni-
ties in flexible labour markets.
However, strict EPL may also account for the
higher ethnic occupational segregation in some coun-
tries. If the EPL is strict, immigrants may increasingly
be ‘pushed’ into the secondary labour market where
the regulation tends to be more flexible than in the pri-
mary—even in otherwise strictly regulated labour mar-
kets (Kogan, 2007). Consequently, we therefore expect
that strict EPL leads to longer unemployment duration
for immigrants—especially when making the transition
into the primary labour market—and increases transi-
tions into inactivity (Hypothesis 3).
Additionally, as there is less competition and
lower appreciation of human capital in the secondary
labour market, immigrants should have better job
opportunities in this sector (Kogan, 2007; Piore,
1986). The acceptance of poor jobs by immigrants is
believed to be due to their ignorance about the host-
2 The reservation wage refers to the lowest wage offer that
the unemployed will accept.
3 Here, we use the terminology of job search theory. This
refers to the distribution of wages that are ‘offered’ to the
unemployed.
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country’s labour market, their expectation of a tempo-
rary stay in Europe (Bonacich, 1972; Kogan, 2004b;
Piore, 1986) and the even poorer job quality in their
country of origin (Piore, 1986). Consequently, previ-
ous research has confirmed that immigrants find jobs
easier in labour markets that have a high demand for
low-skilled labour (Kogan, 2006; Reyneri & Fullin,
2011). In line with this, we therefore anticipated that
transitions to the secondary sector increase relatively
more for immigrants as the demand for low-skilled
labour increases (Hypothesis 4).
Immigration policy
Finally, immigration policy and tradition are also likely
to affect the labour market integration of immigrants
(Kogan, 2003; Lewin-Epstein et al., 2006). Asylum
seekers and refugees are generally among the groups
that experience the greatest difficulties in the labour
market. This may be explained by the existence of men-
tal and physical problems (see e.g., Kivling-Boden &
Sundbom, 2001), but also the fact that many come from
countries where transferability of human capital to a
European context is more difficult. Following this line
of reasoning, if immigration policy is strict and tailored
to meet labour market needs, immigrants are easier to
integrate. However, if immigration policy is strongly
affected by humanitarian considerations giving prefer-
ence to refugees and asylum seekers, the labour market
integration of immigrants is expected to be poorer (Bor-
jas, 1987; Chiswick, 1999; Kogan, 2007). Consequently,
we foresee that the more the immigration policy is influ-
enced by humanitarian considerations, the longer is the
unemployment duration of immigrants compared with
that of the native-born, and the more likely immigrants
are to leave the labour force (Hypothesis 5).
Data and methodology
Data
In this study, we used the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), a high-quality standardised
longitudinal household survey conducted in 15 Euro-
pean countries (EUROSTAT, 2001). The ECHP con-
sists of 8 waves covering the years 1994–2001. The
data provide extensive information on labour market
status, job and demographic characteristics, and offer
retrospective monthly information for every year
prior to the survey. This means that we had longitudi-
nal information for 96 months. The latter feature
makes ECHP particularly suitable for event-history
analysis (see e.g., Tatsiramos, 2009).4
The analysis focused on unemployed individuals
from 18 to 65 years. Only 12 of the 15 ECHP coun-
tries were used in our analysis, as we had to exclude
Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden due to data
limitations. In greater detail, following the principle
of Pichler (2011), we excluded Ireland due to a
small immigrant sample. The Netherlands and
Sweden were excluded because monthly employ-
ment information was unavailable. After deleting
these countries and left-censored spells,5 our sample
included 36,810 unemployment spells of which
1,458 referred to non-EU immigrants from non-
Western countries.6
The definition of immigrant status was based on
the continent of birth (Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia,
or South America) rather than on citizenship.7 This
definition is more comparable across countries in that
citizenship legislation differs considerably between
European countries. We would have preferred an
even more detailed distinction according to the coun-
try of birth as we acknowledge that characteristics of
the country of origin and the conditions of migration
are relevant for determining immigrants’ labour mar-
ket outcomes (e.g., van Tubergen et al., 2004). This
information is, however, unavailable.
The variable referring to unemployment benefits is
central to our analysis. We constructed a time-varying
variable indicating the monthly amount of unemploy-
ment benefits. As ECHP does not provide direct infor-
mation about monthly amounts, we derived this
information from the yearly amount of unemployment
benefits, the number of months in unemployment and
from whether the individual was receiving unemploy-
ment benefits at interview time. We further defined the
replacement rate as the monthly amount of unemploy-
ment benefits relative to the monthly salary in the last
4 Other studies on the outcomes of immigrants in Europe
have also used the ECHP (e.g. Adsera & Chiswick, 2006;
Buchel & Frick, 2005; Williams, 2011).
5 Left-censoring – individuals who were unemployed at the
onset of the survey – has partly been taken into account.
More specifically, most left-censored cases were included
in the analysis as the missing unemployment duration was
recalculated using variables PJ002 and PJ003 of the ECHP
database, which provides information on the time that the
person stopped his/her last job. We deleted the left-
censored spells where these variables were missing. The
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these left-
censored spells (results of this sensitivity analysis are avail-
able on request).
6 These unemployment spells refer to 21,325 individuals, of
whom 979 are non-EU immigrants. Sensitivity analysis
indicated that the results are neither sensitive to the inclu-
sion of countries with relatively small immigrant samples
nor are they driven by the countries with the largest immi-
grant samples (results are available on request).
7 For 9 countries we used the variable pm007c or pm007b
which distinguishes between being born in the country of
residence or in a different region of the world. In case this
information was unavailable (either if it was missing or in
the case of Germany, Luxembourg or Greece), immigrant
status was reported ‘Unknown’.
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job.8 To account for benefit duration, we included a
variable indicating whether the individual was close to
benefit exhaustion using the benefit-generosity index of
Scruggs and Alan (2006). As evident from Table 1
below, differences in replacement rates between immi-
grants and native-born varied across the countries. In
the UK, the replacement rate of immigrants was higher
than that of native-born for the first 6 months, which
could be explained by the types of jobs that are held
by immigrants. From previous studies we know that
the labour market position of migrants in the UK is
polarised, as immigrants are overrepresented in the bot-
tom and the high end of the labour market (Dustmann
et al., 2005). Migrants also have a higher replacement
rate than native-born in the two Scandinavian coun-
tries, Denmark and Finland. In the case of Denmark,
this is probably because unemployment insurance is de
facto a flat rate for nearly everybody (Goul Andersen,
2011). This also means that when immigrants are over-
represented at the bottom end of the wage distribution,
their replacement rate will, on average, be higher than
that of the native-born. In most Continental and South-
ern European countries, immigrants generally receive
benefits with a lower replacement rate than for native-
born. In the Austria, immigrants have much less access
to unemployment insurance than native-born (Winter-
Ebmer & Zweim€uller, 1999).
Following Kogan (2006, 2007), Fleischmann and
Dronkers (2010) and Reyneri and Fullin (2011), we
also used three macro variables. First, the EPL index
(time varying) is based on the level of hiring and fir-
ing regulations and the easiness of using temporary
contracts (OECD, 2004). Hiring and firing regulations
were the weakest in the UK and in the two Scandina-
vian countries, Finland and especially Denmark,
while they were the strictest in the Southern Euro-
pean countries (see Figure 1).
Second, the size of the secondary labour market is a
time-varying variable measuring the percentage of work-
ers employed in this sector according to the ISEI occu-
pational scale (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). The
secondary sector includes the unskilled, semi-skilled and
low-skilled occupations that are assigned the scores 16
to 33 on the ISEI-scale (for further discussion, see
Kogan, 2007). In the late 1990s, there was considerable
variation in the size of the secondary labour market
across Europe (see Figure 2). The availability of low-
skilled jobs was the largest in Southern Europe—almost
50% of all jobs in Portugal belonged to the secondary
sector—whereas this sector was much smaller in North-
Western Europe (e.g., in the UK it amounted to 18%).
Third, we used the percentage of asylum seekers in
relation to the total population of incoming non-EU
Table 1. Differences in the average replacement rate between natives and immigrants (for individuals unemployed 6 months or less)
Average replacement rate
for natives
Average replacement rate for
non-EU immigrants
Difference – immigrants compared
to natives
UK 50-75 % 175 % "*
Denmark 175 % 175 % "
Finland 175 % 175 % "
Belgium 175 % 175 % #
Germany 175 % 175 % #*
France 175 % 175 % "
Luxembourg 175 % 175 % #*
Austria 175 % 50-75 % #*
Portugal 175 % 50-75 % #*
Spain 50-75 % 50-75 % #
Italy 175 % 175 % "
Greece 25-50 % 25-50 % "
Note: *Indicates whether immigrants on average receive significantly more or less than natives.
Figure 1. Employment protection legislation in the EU (average for
the late 1990s).
8 The replacement rate was calculated as a percentage of
unemployment benefits relative to the previous wage. If
wage for the previous time period (T-1) was missing for a
specific individual, we replaced wage by the value for T-2.
In cases where wage is missing for the whole observation
period, we imputed wage by the average predicted wage
for individuals in a specific country with similar observed
characteristics.
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migrants as a time-varying macro-level proxy for the
focus of immigration policy (see also Kogan, 2007).9
As shown in Table 2, the proportion of asylum
seekers varied among the countries under scrutiny. It
was mainly the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Bel-
gium and The Netherlands that received many human-
itarian migrants. The exception was Finland, which,
as other new migration countries, received much
fewer asylum seekers (Kogan, 2007).
The cross-country variations we observed within the
same welfare regime give further support to the argu-
ment that it is necessary to measure institutional factors
more precisely than by the welfare regime approach.10
The list of control variables included measures for
human capital, equivalent household income, demo-
graphic characteristics, the sequence of the unemploy-
ment spell, regional unemployment rates, country- and
year-dummies. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics
for the main control variables separately for immigrants
and native-born for the first and sixth unemployment
month. According to these statistics, most migrants
originate from Eastern Europe and Africa and are on
average a few years older than the native-born. The
immigrants are more likely than the native-born to
have children below the age of 12 and to be married. It
is also interesting to note that unemployed immigrants,
on average, have a higher educational level, but unlike
native-born, it is not the most highly educated immi-
grants that exit unemployment first.
Methodology
We employed an event-history model distinguishing
between three competing risks—inactivity, primary
labour market, secondary labour market—to study
how institutions influence the labour market integra-
tion of immigrants. Besides studying how benefit gen-
erosity, EPL, demand for low-skilled labour and
immigration tradition influence the native-born/
immigrant gap in unemployment duration, we also
examined the state that follows an unemployment spell.
Specifically, we studied whether unemployment is
followed by employment or inactivity and, in the case
of employment, we distinguished between exits to the
primary and the secondary labour market. The distinc-
tion between the primary and secondary labour market
follows the definition that was explained above.
Formally, we followed the approach of Allison
(1982), who showed that, if the data are organised in
a person-month file, it is possible to estimate a dura-
tion model with competing risks using a multinomi-
nal logit regression. In this model, the dependent
variable is the conditional probability that an individ-
ual i makes the transition into state m in time point t
conditional that (s)he has remained unemployed until
time point t21. This conditional probability depends
on a function of unemployment duration t – duration
dependence – and on several institutional and demo-
graphic characteristics.11 We also included fixed
effects for the countries of reference. After testing
several functions for duration dependence (piecewise
constant, linear, log linear, curvelinear functions) by
comparing the model fit measures Akaike Information
Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC
and BIC), we used the logarithmic specification that
Figure 2. The secondary sector as pct. of the total labour market
(average for 1995–2000).
Source: Kogan (2007), based on calculations from the EU-LFS.
9 This variable is included in the model as a categorical vari-
able (ranging from less than 20% to more than 40%) as
this specification demonstrated the best model fit measures.
10 For a detailed description and discussion on cross-country
variation in the institutional setup that is relevant for the
labour market integration of immigrants, see Kogan
(2007) and Diop-Christensen (2014).
11 The multinomial logistic regression is an extension of the
binary logistic regression to model an outcome variable
with more than two categories. In the binary logistic
regression, the outcome variable is a transformation (i.e.,
logit) of the probability for membership of one category.
In the multinomial logistic regression, we predict member-
ship of more than two categories. For example, if the out-
come variable has four categories (1, 2, 3, 4), the
multinomial logistic regression consists of three compari-
sons where membership to one category is compared each
time with membership in one of the other three. In prac-
tice, this means that one always needs to select a baseline
category. In our case, unemployment is the reference or
baseline category (1), while inactivity (2), employment in
the secondary labour market (3) and in the primary labour
market (4) are the other three states. This means that the
data are organised in such a way that there is a line for
each month an individual is unemployed and a corre-
sponding variable indicating the duration of unemploy-
ment until that time point (e.g. 12 if the individual has
been unemployed for one year). If this observation is fol-
lowed by an observation where the individual is still in
unemployment, the dependent variable takes the value 1.
The dependent variable also takes the value 1 if this is the
last observation of the individual (i.e., the spell is right-
censored). If the observation is followed by an observation
where the individual is in inactivity (secondary and pri-
mary labour market, respectively), the dependent variable
takes the value 2 (3 and 4, respectively). In this case, no
further observations from this individual are included in
our analysis.
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performed best. To correct for possible bias in dura-
tion dependence as well as for possible correlation
between the competing risks, we controlled for unob-
served heterogeneity using a parametric approach
(Vermunt, 1997). Our choice on the functional form
of unobserved heterogeneity is based on the BIC and
in the AIC (Agresti, 2002). The conditional transition
probability for an individual i to a competing risk j
conditional of remaining t months in unemployment
and of a vector of observed characteristics Xit can be
expressed as:




















where eij represents the unobserved individual fixed
effects assumed to be independent of observed char-
acteristics, but varying with destination states j. We
further assumed that eij follows a standard normal
distribution.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics at different time points of the unemployment spell.*
Natives (month 1) Non-EU imm. (month 1) Natives (month 6) Non-EU imm. (month 6)
Eastern Europe (%) – 25,1 – 19,4
Africa (%) – 23,6 – 24,1
Asia (%) – 7,1 – 8,4
South America (%) – 8,0 – 8,6
Country of origin unknown (%) – 36,2 – 39,5
Average age 33,2 35,7* 33,7 36,8*
Female (%) 51,2 50,0 53,5 50,0
Children <12 years (%) 31,8 42,0* 31,7 39,9*
Married (%) 43,1 64,2* 36,8 63,2*
Low educational level (%) 50,2 41,0* 53,5 41,2*
Medium educational level (%) 34,0 36,7 33,4 36,5
High educational level (%) 15,8 22,4* 13,1 22,3*
Average equiv. household income 10 543,6 10 905,5 9 643,5 9 987,9
Total 36 810 1 458 18 744 834
Note: *Significant differences between immigrants and natives at a 5 % level.
Table 2. Immigration flows
Non-nationals by main countries of citizenship in the EU15 % Non-EU15 % Asylum
seekers
UK 21 % Ireland, 6 % India, 5 % USA, 4 % Italy, 3 % Pakistan, 3 % Bangladesh,
3 % Germany, 10 % other EU-citizens, 45 % others.
57 % 36 %
Denmark 16 % Turkey, 8 % Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 % UK, 5 % Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, 5 % Norway,
5 % Somalia, 5 % Germany, 7 % other EU citizens, 44 % others.
78 % 53 %
Finland 24 % Russian Federation, 12 % Estonia, 10 % Sweden, 7 % Somalia, 4 % Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia,
3 % Iraq, 3 % Vietnam, 10 % other EU-citizens, 27 % others.
80 % 20 %
Belgium 24 % Italy, 15 % Morocco, 12 % France, 9 % Netherlands, 8 % Turkey, 5 % Spain, 4 % Germany,
10 % Other EU-citizens, 13 % others.
36 % 64 %
Germany 29 % Turkey, 10 % Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, 8 % Italy, 5 % Greece, 4 % Poland,
4 % Bosnia and Herzegovina., 3 % former USSR, 12 % other EU-citizens, 25 % others
75 % 31 %
France 18 % Portugal, 17 % Algeria, 16 % Morocco, 7 % Italy, 6 % Spain, 6 % Tunisia,
5 % Turkey, 6 % other EU-citizens, 19 % others
63 % 45 %
Luxembourg 37 % Portugal, 13 % Italy, 11 % France, 9 % Belgium, 7 % Germany, 3 % UK,
3 % The Netherlands, 6 % other EU-citizens, 11 % others
11 % 15 %
Austria 46 % former Yugoslavia, 19 % Turkey, 31 % other EU-citizens, 4 % others 69 % 17 %
Portugal 23 % Cape Verde, 11 % Brazil, 9 % Angola, 7 % Guinea Bissau, 7 % UK, 6 % Spain, 5 % USA,
14 % other EU-citizens, 18 % others
68 % 16 %
Spain 18 % Morocco, 11 % UK, 8 % Germany, 6 % Portugal, 6 % France, 4 % Italy,
3 % Peru, 19 % other EU-citizens, 25 % others
46 % 68 %
Italy 13 % Morocco, 10 % former Yugoslavia, 6 % Albania, 5 % Tunisia, 5 % Philippines, 4 % Germany,
3 % China, 11 % other EU-citizens, 43 % others
85 % 9 %
Greece 12 % former USSR, 10 % USA, 9 % UK, 6 % Germany, 4 % Egypt, 4 % Philippines, 4 % Bulgaria,
13 % other EU-citizens, 38 % others
62 % 19 %
Source: Based on Kogan (2007: 30 and 38)
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We allowed for multiple unemployment spells per
individual and included fixed effects to account for
differences between them. By accounting for random
individual effects, we also corrected for the possible
correlation between these spells that is introduced by
spell-constant unobserved factors (Van den Berg,
2001). In essence, we therefore estimated a 2-level
multilevel model (monthly information nested within
individuals) with fixed effects for the order of the
multiple spells.
Results of the multivariate analysis
In total, we estimated six different event-history mod-
els. Models 1, 3 and 5 explore exits to inactivity or
employment, whilst Models 2, 4 and 6 examine tran-
sitions into inactivity, the secondary or the primary
labour market. Within each set of 3 models, the first
serves as a reference as it includes no measures for
institutions/structures (Models 1 and 2). The specifi-
cation of the second and third models differs in the
operationalisation of unemployment benefits. More
specifically, in Models 3 and 4, benefits are measured
with a dummy variable indicating whether the indi-
vidual receives benefits or not. In Models 5 and 6,
benefits are measured by the replacement rate—the
amount of unemployment benefit relative to the last
monthly salary. Specifically, unemployment benefits
were operationalised with 4 dummies corresponding
to different replacement levels (0–25%, 25–50%,
Table 4. Results from the competing risk duration model without institutional variables.*
Model 1 Model 2
Inactivity Employment Inactivity Secondary sector Primary sector
Intercept 27,706 (0,156) 22,654 (0,069) 27,389 (0,147) 24,164 (0,112) 23,510 (0,096)
Individual level
Eastern Europe 0,134 (0,180) 20,574 (0,134) 20,073 (0,167) 20,263 (0,198) 20,546 (0,185)
Africa 20,277 (0,212) 20,528 (0,120) 20,372 (0,205) 20,719 (0,190) 20,255 (0,148)
Asia 20,064 (0,307) 20,920 (0,210) 20,193 (0,295) 20,258 (0,325) 21,204 (0,327)
South America 0,210 (0,245) 20,154 (0,176) 0,170 (0,229) 20,363 (0,334) 0,206 (0,232)
Country of origin unknown 0,166 (0,113) 20,780 (0,083) 0,050 (0,105) 20,162 (0,127) 21,017 (0,113)
Age 20,059 (0,010) 0,053 (0,007) 20,052 (0,009) 0,025 (0,011) 0,075 (0,010)
Age2 0,001 (0,000) 20,001 (0,000) 0,001 (0,000) 20,001 (0,000) 20,002 (0,000)
Female 0,547 (0,056) 20,110 (0,030) 0,559 (0,054) 20,900 (0,051) 0,464 (0,041)
Children <12 years 20,039 (0,081) 0,034 (0,035) 20,067 (0,079) 0,182 (0,050) 20,120 (0,053)
Married 20,018 (0,074) 0,472 (0,037) 0,044 (0,071) 0,326 (0,057) 0,440 (0,054)
Female*children 0,535 (0,088) 20,309 (0,046) 0,502 (0,085) 20,285 (0,067) 20,242 (0,064)
Female*married 0,644 (0,080) 20,451 (0,045) 0,544 (0,077) 20,054 (0,071) 20,506 (0,063)
Medium education 20,185 (0,039) 0,049 (0,027) 20,168 (0,037) 20,621 (0,038) 0,725 (0,033)
High education 20,260 (0,054) 0,414 (0,031) 20,177 (0,052) 21,649 (0,070) 1,512 (0,042)
Equivalent household income 0,001 (0,003) 0,031 (0,001) 0,005 (0,003) 0,016 (0,002) 0,033 (0,002)
Duration dependence 0,185 (0,018) 0,085 (0,012) 0,274 (0,018) 0,011 (0,014) 0,037 (0,014)
Spell ongoing at the start of the survey 20,670 (0,062) 20,864 (0,040) 20,825 (0,060) 20,703 (0,059) 20,772 (0,053)
Country level
Unemployment rate 20,009 (0,004) 20,044 (0,003) 20,015 (0,004) 20,023 (0,004) 20,068 (0,004)
Finland** 0,250 (0,100) 0,526 (0,057) 0,228 (0,095) 0,459 (0,103) 0,534 (0,073)
Denmark 0,194 (0,010) 0,145 (0,060) 0,216 (0,094) 0,433 (0,098) 20,143 (0,077)
Belgium 20,242 (0,113) 20,263 (0,067) 20,212 (0,106) 20,042 (0,114) 20,594 (0,088)
France 20,281 (0,094) 20,012 (0,052) 20,267 (0,089) 0,097 (0,091) 20,100 (0,069)
Austria 0,394 (0,120) 0,333 (0,071) 0,428 (0,114) 0,533 (0,114) 20,098 (0,103)
Luxembourg 0,711 (0,200) 20,023 (0,121) 0,660 (0,190) 0,012 (0,270) 20,037 (0,176)
Italy 0,387 (0,076) 20,538 (0,047) 0,307 (0,072) 20,234 (0,084) 20,770 (0,065)
Spain 0,502 (0,078) 0,088 (0,047) 0,481 (0,073) 0,462 (0,085) 20,132 (0,065)
Portugal 20,017 (0,094) 20,152 (0,058) 20,078 (0,089) 0,228 (0,093) 20,463 (0,078)
Greece 0,522 (0,084) 20,460 (0,053) 0,418 (0,079) 20,066 (0,090) 20,686 (0,068)
UK 0,427 (0,121) 20,294 (0,074) 0,394 (0,116) 20,581 (0,130) 20,026 (0,096)
Individual level variance (random effects) 20,515 (0,039) 0,970 (0,018) 0,087 (0,032) 21,329 (0,022) 1,271 (0,022)
AIC 206986,62 227734,82
BIC 207642,40 228718,49
Notes: *Bold coefficients indicate significance at a 5% level while bold and italic indicates a 10% significance level.
**Germany is the reference category.
Spell sequence and year-dummies are controlled for, but the results are not presented in the table.
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50–75%, and larger than 75%). Due to the loss of sta-
tistical power, we could only include an interaction
between a general dummy for immigrants and each
institution/structure.12 Estimates of Models 1 and 2
are presented in Table 4. The estimates of Models 3
to 6 for the main variables of interest are presented in
Tables 5 and 6. By looking at the model-fit measures
(see the bottom of Tables 4–6), we concluded that the
preferred models are those that control for host coun-
try features and operationalize unemployment benefits
as replacement rate (Models 5 and 6).13
The estimates of the reference models (see Table
4) confirm that immigrants are less likely to exit to
employment than are native-born (see Model 1).
Immigrants from Asia are the most disadvantaged
group. When distinguishing between exits to the pri-
mary and to the secondary labour market (Model 2),
it is evident that this effect is stronger for transitions
into the primary sector for immigrants coming from
Eastern Europe and from Asia, and for transitions
into the secondary labour market for immigrants
coming from Africa and South America. In contrast
to the findings concerning exits to employment, there
is hardly any evidence for immigrant–native-born dif-
ferences in transitions to inactivity. The only signifi-
cant difference between immigrants and native-born
for transitions to inactivity emerges for migrants com-
ing from Africa. These immigrants are significantly
less likely to move to inactivity than are native-born.
Probably this is because African immigrants uni-
formly are in a disadvantaged position and have so
Table 5. Results from the competing risk duration model including institutional variables.*
Model 3 Model 4
Inact. Empl. Inact. Sec. Prim.
Eastern Europe 2,061 (1,903) 23,996 (1,353) 1,949 (1,860) 23,825 (1,916) 24,444 (1,510)
Africa 1,559 (1,871) 23,715 (1,317) 1,412 (1,831) 23,985 (1,852) 23,833 (1,471)
Asia 1,921 (1,898) 23,960 (1,331) 1,780 (1,858) 23,496 (1,902) 24,796 (1,502)
South America 2,201 (1,907) 23,441 (1,366) 2,111 (1,866) 23,778 (1,894) 23,489 (1,503)
Country of origin unknown 1,757 (1,779) 23,876 (1,234) 1,570 (1,741) 23,207 (1,760) 24,612 (1,405)
Benefit exhaustion 1,098 (0,058) 0,209 (0,048) 1,102 (0,058) 0,090 (0,075) 0,319 (0,061)
Unempl. Benefits 20,518 (0,046) 20,021 (0,023) 20,563 (0,045) 0,031 (0,032) 0,020 (0,031)
Unempl. Benefits*Non-EU 20,193 (0,164) 0,049 (0,109) 20,156 (0,158) 20,103 (0,158) 0,124 (0,149)
Unempl. Benefits*exhaustion 20,348 (0,134) 0,301 (0,080) 20,349 (0,134) 0,501 (0,112) 0,053 (0,113)
Replacement rate< 25% – – – – –
Replacement rate >25% & <50% – – – – –
Replacement rate >50% & <75% – – – – –
Replacement rate >75% – – – – –
Non-EU*repl. >0 & <25% – – – – –
Non-EU*repl. >25% & <50% – – – – –
Non-EU*repl. >50% & <75% – – – – –
Non-EU*repl. >75% – – – – –
Exhaust.*repl. >0 & <25% – – – – –
Exhaust.*repl. 25% & <50% – – – – –
Exhaust.*repl. 50% & <75% – – – – –
Exhaust.*repl. >75% – – – – –
EPL 0,002 (0,088) 0,086 (0,045) 0,019 (0,086) 0,044 (0,066) 0,141 (0,061)
Non-EU*EPL 0,140 (0,158) 20,069 (0,106) 0,162 (0,154) 20,114 (0,161) 20,122 (0,140)
Size of sec. lab. 0,129 (0,066) 20,045 (0,035) 0,113 (0,065) 20,009 (0,048) 20,003 (0,050)
Size of sec. lab.2 20,002 (0,001) 0,001 (0,001) 20,002 (0,001) 0,000 (0,001) 20,000 (0,001)
Non-EU*size 20,116 (0,125) 0,257 (0,085) 20,111 (0,122) 0,281 (0,121) 0,288 (0,098)
Non-EU*size2 0,001 (0,002) 20,004 (0,001) 0,001 (0,002) 20,004 (0,002) 20,004 (0,002)
% of asylum seekers 20,037 (0,059) 0,145 (0,029) 20,031 (0,058) 0,240 (0,044) 0,056 (0,039)
Non-EU*asylum Seekers 0,010 (0,087) 20,236 (0,060) 20,033 (0,084) 20,254 (0,084) 20,202 (0,081)
AIC 206403,31 227080,70
BIC 207251,03 228352,28
Notes: *Bold coefficients indicate significance at a 5% level while bold and italic coefficients indicate a 10% significance level. The results for the con-
trol variables are available upon request.
12 This is similar to the approach of Kogan (2006).
13 According to the guidelines defined by Raftery (1995),
when the BIC improves with more than 10, the evidence
in favour of the extended model is very strong.
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few resources that withdrawing from the labour mar-
ket is not an option.
Hypothesis 1 suggests that benefits provide disin-
centive effects for employment that are stronger for
immigrants than for native-born. As shown in the sec-
ond column of Model 3, both the main effect of the
dummy for benefits and the interaction with the immi-
grant dummy are insignificant. The second column of
Model 6 suggests that the differences between immi-
grants and native-born emerge only when making a
transition into the secondary labour market and the
replacement rate of benefits is larger than 75%. There-
fore and in line with Hypothesis 1, it seems that very
generous benefits increase the reservation wage of
immigrants more than that of native-born.
To examine further the aforementioned findings,
we plotted the predicted probabilities for transitions to
the secondary sector for immigrants and for native-
born (see Figure 3).14 This figure shows that the most
generous benefits have a positive effect for native-
born, but not for immigrants. More specifically, for
immigrants, the transition probability to the secondary
labour market is practically the same for those who
do not receive benefits and those with the highest
replacement rates. Therefore, in line with Hypothesis
2, there is no reason to believe that high replacement
rates produce disincentive effects for immigrants.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that benefits provide eco-
nomic and personal resources to sustain job search that
are more important for immigrants than for native-
born. The existence of such resources is generally
Table 6. Results from the competing risk duration model including institutional variables and replacement rate indicators.*
Model 5 Model 6
Inact. Empl. Inact. Sec. Prim.
Eastern Europe 1,807 (1,889) 23,573 (1,307) 1,776 (1,847) 23,716 (1,868) 24,238 (1,492)
Africa 1,311 (1,857) 23,288 (1,274) 1,248 (1,817) 23,843 (1,806) 23,615 (1,453)
Asia 1,626 (1,890) 23,523 (1,285) 1,579 (1,850) 23,315 (1,848) 24,566 (1,482)
South America 1,991 (1,895) 23,060 (1,326) 1,975 (1,854) 23,706 (1,852) 23,230 (1,487)
Country of origin unknown 1,461 (1,763) 23,446 (1,189) 1,363 (1,726) 23,012 (1,707) 24,396 (1,386)
Benefit exhaustion 1,088 (0,057) 0,214 (0,046) 1,093 (0,057) 0,100 (0,071) 0,320 (0,059)
Unempl. Benefits – – – – –
Unempl. Benefits*Non-EU – – – – –
Unempl. Benefits*exhaustion – – – – –
Replacement rate< 25% 20,323 (0,086) 20,020 (0,040) 20,421 (0,084) 0,094 (0,057) 0,072 (0,054)
Replacement rate >25% & <50% 20,601 (0,071) 20,185 (0,032) 20,655 (0,069) 20,173 (0,048) 20,076 (0,044)
Replacement rate >50% & <75% 20,582 (0,065) 20,117 (0,031) 20,628 (0,064) 20,084 (0,043) 20,076 (0,043)
Replacement rate >75% 20,541 (0,063) 0,189 (0,028) 20,550 (0,061) 0,229 (0,040) 0,173 (0,040)
Non-EU*repl. >0 & <25% 21,163 (0,529) 20,071 (0,206) 21,061 (0,518) 20,208 (0,285) 20,059 (0,262)
Non-EU*repl. >25% & <50% NS NS NS NS NS
Non-EU*repl. >50% & <75% NS NS NS NS NS
Non-EU*repl. >75% 0,234 (0,211) 20,361 (0,122) 0,171 (0,204) 20,573 (0,184) 20,143 (0,162)
Exhaust.*repl. >0 & <25% NS NS NS NS NS
Exhaust.*repl. 25% & <50% 20,287 (0,244) 0,422 (0,131) 20,258 (0,243) 0,679 (0,174) 0,126 (0,195)
Exhaust.*repl. 50% & <75% 20,305 (0,228) 0,140 (0,134) 20,292 (0,227) 0,424 (0,176) 20,234 (0,205)
Exhaust.*repl. >75% 20,452 (0,236) 0,438 (0,120) 20,462 (0,235) 0,594 (0,162) 0,241 (0,174)
EPL 0,009 (0,088) 0,089 (0,045) 0,025 (0,086) 0,055 (0,067) 0,143 (0,061)
Non-EU*EPL 0,169 (0,160) 20,091 (0,105) 0,190 (0,155) 20,158 (0,164) 20,142 (0,141)
Size of sec. lab. 0,127 (0,066) 20,046 (0,035) 0,112 (0,065) 20,012 (0,048) 20,002 (0,050)
Size of sec. lab.2 20,002 (0,001) 0,001 (0,001) 20,002 (0,001) 0,000 (0,001) 20,000 (0,001)
Non-EU*size 20,103 (0,124) 0,238 (0,083) 20,103 (0,122) 0,276 (0,119) 0,282 (0,097)
Non-EU*size2 0,001 (0,002) 20,003 (0,001) 0,001 (0,002) 20,004 (0,002) 20,004 (0,002)
% of asylum seekers 20,035 (0,059) 0,143 (0,029) 20,030 (0,058) 0,236 (0,044) 0,056 (0,039)
Non-EU*asylum Seekers 20,029 (0,086) 20,225 (0,060) 20,051 (0,083) 20,237 (0,085) 20,197 (0,081)
AIC 206252,40 226953,88
BIC 207196,09 228369,41
Notes: *Bold coefficients indicate significance at a 5% level while bold and italic coefficients indicate a 10% significance level. The results for the con-
trol variables are available upon request.
14 These predicted probabilities are calculated as weighted
means of the Class-specific estimates. The posterior mem-
bership probabilities are used as weights. More informa-
tion on the calculation of these predicted probabilities can
be found in Vermunt and Magidson (2013).
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confirmed by Models 3 and 4, as unemployed who
receive unemployment benefits are less likely to make
a transition into inactivity. However, these two models
suggest that no differences between immigrants and
native-born exist. When shifting our attention to Mod-
els 5 and 6, we see that immigrants receiving low ben-
efits are much less likely to exit to inactivity than are
native-born. This is further illustrated in Figure 4,
which shows that the predicted probabilities of becom-
ing inactive is roughly equal for immigrants and
native-born who do not receive benefits. In contrast,
for those receiving the lowest levels of benefits, the
conditional probability of becoming inactive is much
lower (almost zero) for immigrants than for native-
born. Therefore, in accordance with Hypothesis 2, low
benefits provide stronger incentives or resources for
immigrants than for native-born to sustain job search.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the unemployment dura-
tion gap between immigrants and native-born increases
with the strictness of employment protection, espe-
cially for transitions to the primary labour market.
This hypothesis is not confirmed by our analysis, as
the interaction between EPL and the immigrant
dummy is insignificant in Models 3 to 6. Actually, for
both native-born and immigrants, strict EPL increases
the conditional probability of exiting to employment
(see Models 3 and 5), and in particular for exits to the
primary labour market (see Models 4 and 6).
Hypothesis 4 suggests that transitions to the sec-
ondary sector increase more for immigrants than for
native-born with the demand for low-skilled labour.
For all models, a curve linear relationship is assumed
between the demand for low-skilled labour and the
conditional probability of exiting from unemploy-
ment. The results confirm Hypothesis 4, as the condi-
tional probability for exiting to the secondary labour
market increases with the size of the demand for low-
skilled labour for immigrants but not for native-born.
Figure 6. Predicted probabilities for transitions into the secondary
sector and proportion of asylum seekers.
Note: *Calculations are based on 6–12 months of unemployment.
Figure 5. Predicted probabilities for transitions to employment and
size of the secondary sector.
Note: *Calculations are based on 6–12 months of unemployment.
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for transitions to the secondary
labour market and different benefit levels.
Note: *Calculations are based on 6–12 months of unemployment.
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities for transitions to inactivity and
different benefit levels.
Note: *Calculations are based on 6–12 months of unemployment.
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Interestingly, we find the same result also for the pri-
mary labour market. It seems that although immi-
grants are overrepresented in the secondary sector, the
increased availability of low-skilled jobs has spill-
over effects that improve the overall labour market
position of immigrants. This becomes obvious in Fig-
ure 5, which presents the average predicted probabil-
ities for native-born and immigrants when the size of
the low-skilled labour force is small (<22%) and
large (>30%). When the low-skilled sector is small,
immigrants have, on average, about a 2.5% lower pre-
dicted probability to enter employment than native-
born. This disadvantage reduces to about 0.5% when
the low-skilled sector reaches 30%.
Finally, Hypothesis 5 suggests that immigrants are
more likely to remain unemployed and to leave the
labour market when immigration policy is driven by
humanitarian considerations. The percentage for asy-
lum seekers is used as a proxy for the orientation of
immigration policy. Results from Models 3 and 5
suggest that the higher the percentage of asylum
seekers, the lower is the likelihood for immigrants to
make a transition to employment. This is illustrated
in Figure 6, which presents the average predicted
probabilities for exits to the secondary labour market
when the percentage of asylum seekers is small
(<20%) and large (>40%). When there are few asy-
lum seekers, the probability of moving to the second-
ary sector is, on average, similar for native-born and
immigrants. However, when the proportion of asylum
seekers exceeds 40%, immigrants are more disadvan-
taged. Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 5, immigration
policy is irrelevant for transitions to inactivity.
Conclusions and discussion
Immigrants suffer from higher unemployment rates in
Scandinavia and Continental Europe than in the
Southern and Anglo-Saxon European countries. This
has raised concern whether generous welfare states
create disincentives for immigrant employment. Such
a suspicion is reinforced by previous research which
studied unemployment incidence and measured wel-
fare generosity at welfare regime level (Kesler, 2006;
Kogan, 2006). In this study, we examined the effect
of host country features—unemployment benefits,
EPL, size of the low-skilled labour market and immi-
gration policy—on the unemployment duration gap
between immigrants and native-born, distinguishing
between three exit states from unemployment (inac-
tivity, secondary and primary labour market exits).
We tested empirically the comparative theoretical
framework with the use of individual level measures
for unemployment benefits.
Our analysis reveals that immigrants from Asia,
Africa and Eastern Europe experience more persistent
unemployment than native-born, especially when
exiting to the primary labour market. However, immi-
grants in unemployment are typically less likely than
native-born to become discouraged and leave the
labour force. Related to the effects of host country
characteristics, our analysis suggests that disincentive
effects of benefits, if any, are very small. In some
cases, unemployment benefits even decrease transi-
tions out of the labour force for immigrants (more
than for native-born) and thereby prevent marginali-
sation. Therefore, our results do not indicate that the
large unemployment-duration gap between immi-
grants and native-born in some countries is caused by
access to generous unemployment benefits.
Our analysis also reveals that immigrants fare bet-
ter in labour markets with a high demand for low-
skilled labour. This is in line with the idea that as
immigrants are over-represented in low-skilled jobs,
their labour market chances increase with the avail-
ability of such jobs. Surprisingly, this does not only
concern the secondary labour market, but also the pri-
mary. A possible mechanism for this spill-over effect
is that as the unemployment rate of immigrants tends
to be relatively low in labour markets with a large
secondary sector, immigrants are less likely to
become stigmatised. Furthermore, immigrants prob-
ably also face less human capital depreciation when
there is a high demand for low-skilled labour because
it is easier for them to find a low-skilled job right
away upon arrival. This job may then serve as a
stepping-stone into a job in the primary sector.
According to the comparative theoretical framework
presented above, employment protection is supposed
to intensify the division between insiders and outsiders
on the labour market and drive immigrants to the out-
siders group. This is not confirmed by our analysis.
Strict EPL neither leads to longer unemployment dura-
tion for immigrants nor does it increase ethnic job seg-
regation or transitions to inactivity.
Finally, we expected that a humanitarian-oriented
immigration policy would be associated with poorer
labour market integration of immigrants as refugees
often face problems that make their labour market inte-
gration difficult. We indeed found evidence that the
nativity unemployment-duration gap is larger in coun-
tries with many humanitarian migrants. However, our
results do not indicate that a humanitarian immigration
policy leads to increased dropouts from the labour force.
All in all, we confirm that institutions impinge upon
the labour market allocation of immigrants, but we con-
tend that access to social security has disincentive
effects for immigrants. Our findings therefore have
important implications for policy makers. It is important
for policy makers to adapt their policies according to
the type of migrants they receive and the general insti-
tutional structure. Countries with many humanitarian
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migrants and a low demand for low-skilled labour need
to provide more support for integrating their immigrant
population on the labour market than do those countries
that have received many labour migrants and/or have a
high demand for low-skilled labour. An active integra-
tion strategy, which includes access to social protection
for immigrants and participation in active labour market
policies, is probably a necessary strategy for the Scan-
dinavian and Continental European countries in order
for their immigrants to overcome other employment
barriers. In line with this, since the beginning of the
new millennium newly arrived immigrants have been
offered official integration programmes throughout
Scandinavia. Sometimes, active participation is a condi-
tion for benefit recipiency (Brochmann & Hagelund,
2011). Such policies are less developed in other Euro-
pean countries (Rinne, 2013).
This study also has significant implications for
future research. Our findings highlight the importance
of examining the nativity unemployment-duration gap,
while measuring economic incentives at individual
level rather than by only examining macrolevel indica-
tors. However, international surveys represent certain
challenges for this and other comparative studies. First,
institutional and policy indicators are not always meas-
ured at individual level (e.g., benefit recipiency, immi-
gration background, participation in active labour
market policies). Second, the identification of immi-
grant- and migration-related variables is often not very
detailed. The current study has distinguished between
regions of birth, but it would have been ideal to obtain
information about country of birth. Likewise, it was
not possible to control for duration of residence and
cultural-linguistic distance to the host country.15 The
development of new international longitudinal datasets
that overcome these challenges could facilitate more
detailed research about the effectiveness of different
integration efforts (e.g., introductory programmes) and
better account for potential selection processes related
to migration that have been identified by previous
research (Pedersen et al., 2008).
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